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Cowboys and Indians: Settler 
Colonialism and the Dog Whistle in U.S. 
Immigration Policy 
HANNAH GORDON* 
The nineteenth-century Indian problem has become the 
twenty-first century border crisis. While the United States 
fancies itself a nation of immigrants, this rhetoric is impos-
sible to square with the reality of the systematic exclusion of 
migrants of color. In particular, the Trump administration 
 
 *  Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review, Volume 74; J.D. Candi-
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Tribal Member, Occaneechi Band of the Saponi Nation. My experience of being 
othered in the land of my ancestors has shaped this Note, my legal education, and 
nearly everything else about my life. People with a wide variety of intentions con-
stantly ask where I am from, as though the brownness of my skin must signal that 
I am from somewhere else. My desire to exist in a place where I look normal drove 
me to Honduras, where I taught English to a tenacious group of middle schoolers 
from 2015 to 2017. I decided to pursue a law degree to advocate for Central Amer-
icans looking for a better life.  
  In regards to asylum law, I am dismayed at what I have found. In regards 
to the mentorship and support I have received at the University of Miami School 
of Law, I am eternally grateful. In particular, I would like to thank Rebecca Sharp-
less for her guidance in this Note and for her unwavering drive in the face of ever-
worsening immigration policy, Romy Lerner for the direct link between her end-
less patience and my professional development, Elizabeth Montano for her love 
and her leadership, the fierce women of the Miami Public Interest Scholarship 
Program, and of course, my team, the University of Miami Law Review. I am also 
grateful to my family, particularly my mother, Mary Hayes Gordon, and my fa-
ther, Dean Gordon, for supporting me through decisions they agreed with (such 
as going to law school) and decisions they did not (inter alia, moving to one of 
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by my Escuela Bilingüe Honduras students—now nearly grown—for their defi-
ance in a world not made for them and for welcoming me into their country even 
as mine shut its doors. Thank you. 
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has taken the exclusion of migrants descended from the In-
digenous inhabitants of Mexico and Central America to a 
reductio ad absurdum. This Note joins a body of scholarship 
that centers the history of genocide in the United States to 
examine what our settler colonial history means for today’s 
immigration law and policy. It concludes that the contempo-
rary treatment of Mexican and Central American migrants 
echoes the ways in which the legal definition of citizenship 
was developed to exclude Indigenous people. Furthermore, 
it urges a reckoning with the past both to make sense of the 
present and to chart a different future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2018, anti-immigration protesters in Arizona asked a 
Navajo legislator if he was an “illegal.”1 State Representative Eric 
Descheenie has medium-brown skin and straight, black hair.2 In-
deed, ingrained into our national psyche is the idea that “real Amer-
icans” 3 are white, and brown skin is a marker of otherness.4 This 
 
 1 Ben Giles & Paulina Pineda, Legislative Staffers Say Pro-Trump Support-




 2 See Photograph of Representative Eric Descheenie, in id. 
 3 This Note recognizes that using “American” to describe only people from 
the United States of America is a misnomer. The Americas, of course, are two 
large continents, comprising everything from Alaska to the Chile, and everyone 
from the Americas could accurately be called “American.” See generally Mariana 
C. Irazu, ¿Por qué en algunos lugares se les llama americanos a los es-
tadounidenses? [Why, in Some Places, Do They Call People from the United 
States “Americans”?], BBC MUNDO [BBC WORLD] (June 8, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-38937236. 
 4 See, e.g., Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American = White?, 88 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 447, 451 (2005) (concluding from a psychologi-
cal study of American students that despite a theoretical endorsement of egalitar-
ianism and a race-blind American identity, in practice, “the view is that some 
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paradigm, of course, puts people like Representative Descheenie in 
the odd position of appearing foreign in their ancestral homelands.5 
At first glance, mistaking an Indigenous person for an “illegal” 
seems absurd. Questionable noun usage aside, however, this mistake 
is oddly understandable. Many of the people who emigrate from 
elsewhere in the Americas, particularly from Mexico and Central 
America, do look quite a lot like Representative Descheenie. Like 
Representative Descheenie, many of these people are descended 
from the Indigenous inhabitants of the Americas.6 When the colo-
nizing powers drew and re-drew the line between the United States 
and Latin America, they did not have the colonized in mind.7 
The United States built a nation by systematically exterminating 
the people who were already here.8 This Note joins a body of schol-
arship that assumes this nation is what it is today because of—rather 
than in spite of—its foundation of genocide.9 The United States 
 
ethnic groups are simply less American than others—not in rights and liberties 
but in the degree to which they embody the concept ‘American.’”); see also Giles 
& Pineda, supra note 1. 
 5 Giles & Pineda, supra note 1. 
 6 Identity vis-à-vis race is as difficult of a subject in Mexico and Central 
America as it is everywhere in the world. Not everyone from these countries iden-
tifies as Indigenous, not even many people with mixed Indigenous ancestry. Iden-
tity is a personal matter, and this Note does not seek to impose upon anyone the 
way she should see herself. However, on a broad scale, most people from these 
countries are of Indigenous descent, and this Note argues that this fact is important 
for how the world sees them. For a full discussion on race in Latin America, see 
generally, e.g., Nancy P. Appelbaum et al., Racial Nations in RACE AND NATION 
IN MODERN LATIN AMERICA 1, 1–22 (Nancy P. Appelbaum et al., eds. 2003) (in-
troducing an anthology on different interpretations of race in Latin America). 
 7 See ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 18 (2014) (“Mexicans continue to migrate as they have for mil-
lennia but now across the arbitrary border that was established in the U.S. war 
against Mexico in 1846–48.”) 
 8 Id. at 1–14. 
 9 Many scholars are embarking on the work of centering the narratives of 
Indigenous people to make sense of the contemporary United States. See, e.g., 
Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795 (2019) (“In fact, if we define federal Indian law as the 
law of national power and rights developed in the context of Native Nations and 
Native peoples, much of constitutional law actually is federal Indian law”); 
DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 1–14 (introducing An Indigenous People’s His-
tory of the United States); Natsu Taylor Saito, Tales of Color and Colonialism: 
Racial Realism and Settler Colonial Theory, 10 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 1, 29 
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hides behind rhetoric about being a nation of immigrants to sanitize 
its violent history of settler colonialism.10 This Note argues that U.S. 
immigration law and policy are designed to deny refuge to people 
Indigenous to the Americas in a way that echoes early jurisprudence 
denying citizenship to Native Americans.11 Immigration law, like 
many fields, can be seen in a different light when viewed as part of 
a settler-colonial project. In the preface to Blood and Land: The 
Story of Native North America, anthropologist J.C.H. King observes 
that “Native America provides a touchstone of identity: about who 
we westerners are and particularly about who we are not.”12 People 
of Indigenous descent have always been othered in the post-colonial 
United States of America.13 
Part I of this Note gives a brief overview of the historic exclusion 
of Indigenous peoples from the legal and colloquial definitions of 
what it means to be an “American” in the United States. Part II looks 
at what legal options presently exist for people who want to become 
“American.” It concludes that few to none are available for people 
from Mexico and Central America, particularly those seeking es-
cape from violence, poverty, and persecution. Part III dives into the 
executive actions used to narrow the application of asylum in 2018 
and 2019. Part IV argues that the Trump administration’s hateful 
rhetoric and actions toward Mexican and Central American asylum 
seekers mirror the rhetoric and actions historically used to disap-
pear14 Indigenous peoples. This Note concludes with several legis-
lative and policy proposals to right the course of a settler colony that 
has spent the entirety of its history building an identity around who 
it is not. 
 
(2014) (“Those of us who are not Indigenous to this land would not be here but 
for settler occupation and appropriation, and our primary relationship to the struc-
tures of power and privilege must be understood in that context.”). 
 10 Settler colonialism differs from classic colonialism in that the new arrivals 
sought to replace, rather than simply conquer, Indigenous inhabitants. Saito, supra 
note 9, at 25–28. 
 11 See infra Part IV. 
 12 J.C.H. KING, BLOOD AND LAND: THE STORY OF NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 
xi (2017) (emphasis added). 
 13 See DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 1–14. 
 14 Saito, supra note 9, at 26 n.131. This Note uses “disappeared” in the con-
text of international law to describe the phenomenon by which a government com-
mits and covers up murder or arbitrary detention. Id. 
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I. HERE LEGALLY: THE “OTHER ORIGINAL SIN” FROM THE 
MARSHALL TRILOGY TO THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS 
In arguing that Federal Indian Law should be centered within the 
constitutional canon along with the jurisprudence of slavery and 
apartheid, Maggie Blackhawk refers to colonialism as this country’s 
“other original sin.”15 The early Supreme Court grappled with its 
own sovereignty vis-à-vis violent conquest, and the consequences of 
these decisions are still felt today. 
A. The Marshall Trilogy and the Jackson Doctrine: A Nation 
Built on White Supremacy 
1. JOHNSON V. M’INTOSH: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AS MERE 
OCCUPIERS 
Johnson v. M’Intosh16 is a seminal case for the relationship be-
tween Indigenous people and the federal government and the first 
case in the Marshall Trilogy.17 Two white men contested title to the 
same piece of land.18 One chain of title began with a settler colonist, 
the other began with a Native American.19 Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, writing for a unanimous Court,20 held that Indigenous people 
could not exercise dominion over land but instead merely “occu-
pied” it.21 Title was created by the crown with no regard to Indige-
nous people, and these were the legitimate titles when the settlers 
ousted the British in the Revolutionary War.22 In discussing the 
origin of U.S. property law, Chief Justice Marshall noted: 
While the different nations of Europe respected the 
right of the natives, as occupants, they asserted the 
ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed 
 
 15 Blackhawk, supra note 9, at 1800. 
 16 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571–72 (1823). 
 17 Blackhawk, supra note 9, at 1795. The other two cases are Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 
Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 18 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 571–72. 
 19 See id. at 571–73. 
 20 Id. at 571. 
 21 Id. at 579. 
 22 Id. at 579–81. 
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and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate do-
minion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in pos-
session of the natives. These grants have been under-
stood by all, to convey a title to the grantees, subject 
only to the Indian right of occupancy. 
The history of America, from its discovery to the pre-
sent day, proves, we think, the universal recognition 
of these principles.23 
Marshall then, in his own way, recognized the historical anom-
aly of United States settler colonialism in his discussion of the na-
ture of conquest.24 Under normal circumstances, colonizing powers 
either incorporate the conquered into their ranks or govern them as 
a separate people.25 However, Marshall distinguished conquest in 
the United States: 
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were 
fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and 
whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. 
To leave them in possession of their country, was to 
leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a 
distinct people, was impossible, because they were 
as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and 
were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their 
independence.26 
As Marshall spells out, the very foundation of the United States 
as a sovereign nation was premised on the idea that Indigenous peo-
ple were unfit to be members of its society.27 While it may be tempt-
ing to dismiss this history as an embarrassing vestige of a distant 
past, Johnson v. M’Intosh remains good law, and it is unlikely any-
one would be willing to give up her title on the basis that it was 
obtained in violation of human rights. 
 
 23 Id. at 574. 
 24 See id. at 589–90. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 590. 
 27 See id. 
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2. CHEROKEE NATION V. GEORGIA: DEPENDENT DOMESTIC 
NATIONS 
As Georgia passed laws to “annihilate the Cherokee as a political 
society,”28 Chief Justice Marshall wrung his hands at his inability to 
assert jurisdiction over the Cherokee’s claim.29 The Cherokee ar-
gued original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court as a foreign nation 
bringing a claim against a state.30 Although the Court agreed that 
individual Native persons were “aliens,”31 it found that Native Na-
tions were not “foreign nations” within the meaning of the Consti-
tution.32 Marshall instead dubbed Indigenous people as “domestic 
dependent nations” who looked to the federal government, or their 
“great father,” for enlightenment.33 He further expounded that the 
framers could not have intended to include Indians as foreign na-
tions: 
At the time the constitution was framed, the idea of 
appealing to an American court of justice for an as-
sertion of right or a redress of wrong, had perhaps 
never entered the mind of an Indian or of his tribe. 
Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the govern-
ment.34 
He went on to say, in dictum, that even if the Court had jurisdic-
tion, the case presented a political question: “If it be true that the 
Cherokee nation have rights,” the Chief Justice lamented, “this is 
not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted.35 
3. WORCESTER V. GEORGIA: THE DECISION AND THE FALLOUT 
One year after Cherokee Nation, Marshall authored another 
opinion about the relationship between the states and Indigenous 
peoples. In Worcester v. Georgia, the Court held unconstitutional a 
 
 28 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831). 
 29 Id. (“If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better cal-
culated to excite them can be scarcely imagined.”). 
 30 Id. at 16. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 17. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 18. 
 35 Id. at 20. 
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state law prohibiting white persons from “residing within the limits 
of the Cherokee nation without a license,” unless said white person 
took “the oath to support and defend the constitution and laws of the 
state of Georgia.”36 Because the Constitution considered the Chero-
kee as a separate (if inferior) nation, only the federal government 
could legislate with effect to it.37 
Marshall recognized the reality of conflicts over land as Euro-
pean “discovery” grew.38 He considered the Indigenous people 
“[f]ierce and warlike in their character,” noting that “they might be 
formidable enemies, or effective friends.”39 However, he declared 
firmly war powers were only for defense, not for conquest.40 The 
Cherokee were a separate people—a lesser people—and Marshall 
attempted to balance the states’ eagerness to expand with the values 
of the Constitution. As Georgia had no right to criminalize Mr. 
Worcester’s migration to the Cherokee nation, he was to be freed.41  
And yet, President Andrew Jackson openly defied the Court, re-
portedly retorting that “John Marshall has made his decision; now 
let him enforce it.”42 Jackson ordered the withdrawal of all federal 
troops from Georgia, clearing the way for the state to sell Cherokee 
lands to white men for four dollars.43 Mr. Worcester remained im-
prisoned for violation of a law that had been declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court.44 In 1836, only six years later, a com-
bination of state militia members and federal soldiers forced the 
Cherokee to march to Oklahoma in what would become known as 
the Trail of Tears.45 
 
 36 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 537(1832), abrogated by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 
353 (2001). 
 37 Id. at 559–60. 
 38 Id. at 546. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 562–65 (finding that the sentencing of Mr. Worcester for his migra-
tion to the Cherokee nation was repugnant to the Constitution). 
 42 Jeffrey Rosen, Not Even Andrew Jackson Went as Far as Trump in Attack-
ing the Courts, ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2017/02/a-historical-precedent-for-trumps-attack-on-judges/516144/ 
(quoting President Andrew Jackson).  
 43 Blackhawk, supra note 9, at 1823. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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Following the prevailing logic that Europeans had a God-given 
right to dominion because Indigenous people are a subordinate race 
incapable of utilizing the land, the settlers displaced and disappeared 
those who stood in their way.46 While Marshall might not have en-
dorsed outright conquest, every case in the Marshall Trilogy starts 
from an assumption of white supremacy. This assumption succinctly 
summarizes the settlers’ justification for genocide47—indeed; rid-
ding the world of inferior races is the justification for genocide writ 
large.48 The very sovereignty of the United States is based upon the 
hypothesis that the settlers were more deserving of the land than the 
Indigenous people.49 
B. The Taney Court and the Birth of Plenary Power 
While perhaps most infamous for the Dred Scott50 decision, 
Chief Justice Roger Taney’s philosophy of white supremacy also 
guided his view of Native peoples. Eleven years before Dred Scott, 
 
 46 Saito, supra note 9, at 27–28. 
 47 Many scholars have written at length about the history and impact of the 
genocide of Indigenous people. E.g. DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 57–133; 
Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-1976 the 
United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execu-
tion of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 
912 (2002) (“No longer can we remain indifferent and justify these acts of geno-
cide committed by the United States government, its agencies, and its personnel 
against Native Americans as a result of colonization or the need to establish a 
prosperous union.”); Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the 
Seventh Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 48 (2008) (“During [the nine-
teenth century] the U.S. Government officially embraced policies of forced as-
similation aimed at the breakup of the American Indian family.”); T.S. Twibell, 
Rethinking Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823): The Root of the Continued Forced Dis-
placement of American Indians Despite Cobell v. Norton (2001), 23 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 129, 152 (2008) (“The Removal Policy was designed to clear out an 
entire section of the country for European settlement and formalize, or make de 
jure, the policy of removal of Indians that already began to be a de facto policy.”). 
 48 Genocide, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining genocide as 
“[a]n international crime involving acts causing serious physical and mental harm 
with the intent to destroy, partially or entirely, a national, ethnic, racial, or reli-
gious group.”). Academics have speculated that the U.S. reservation system in-
spired Nazi concentration camps. Blackhawk, supra note 9, at 1830 (citing JAMES 
Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 115–16 (2017)). 
 49 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
 50 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
530 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:520 
 
Taney authored the Court’s opinion in United States v. Rogers.51 
William Rogers, a white man, murdered Jacob Nicholson, another 
white man, in Cherokee country.52 Rogers, who was something of a 
nineteenth-century Rachel Dolezal,53 claimed that both he and Ni-
cholson had become members of the Cherokee nation by virtue of 
their domicile in Cherokee country.54 Consequently, Rogers argued, 
the federal courts had no jurisdiction.55 The Court disagreed, finding 
it “very clear” that a white man cannot become an Indian.56 Taney 
reasoned that “[w]hatever obligations the prisoner may have taken 
upon himself by becoming a Cherokee by adoption, his responsibil-
ity to the laws of the United States remained unchanged and undi-
minished. He was still a white man, of the white race, and therefore 
not within the exception in the act of Congress.”57 Whiteness, ac-
cording to Chief Justice Taney, was an inextricable part of U.S. cit-
izenship. 
Taney also broke from his predecessor’s efforts to confine the 
doctrine of discovery.58 Rather than basing the power over Native 
peoples in the text of the Constitution, as Marshall did, Taney rooted 
his reasoning in what would later become known as plenary 
power.59 The United States could enforce its laws in Indian country 
because “from the very moment the general government came into 
existence to this time, it has exercised its power over this unfortunate 
 
 51 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846). 
 52 Id. at 571. 
 53 See Faith Karimi, Rachel Dolezal, White Woman Who Portrayed Herself 
as Black, Accused of Welfare Fraud, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/25/us/rachel-dolezal-welfare-fraud-allegations/in-
dex.html (last updated May 25, 2018, 5:37 PM).  
 54 Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 571. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 572–73 (“And we think it very clear, that a white many who at mature 
age is adopted in an Indian tribe does not thereby become an Indian, and was not 
intended to be embraced . . .”).  
 57 Id. at 573. 
 58 Blackhawk, supra note 9, at 1837. 
 59 Id. at 1837–38; compare Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546 
(1832) (Marshall, C.J.) (pointing to the Supremacy Clause to conclude that state 
legislation cannot contradict treaties made with Native Nations), with Rogers, 45 
U.S. (4 How.) at 571–4 (Taney, C.J.) (reasoning that the nature of conquest gave 
the United States jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country). 
2020] COWBOYS AND INDIANS 531 
 
race in the spirit of humanity and justice.”60 Rogers established what 
would become the pillars of plenary power: an extraconstitutional 
power rooted in the existence of sovereignty itself and a presump-
tion of a political question.61 
A comparison of Marshall’s reasoning with Taney’s shows the 
circular logic of the doctrine of discovery. According to Marshall, 
sovereignty is born from conquest.62 A mere two decades later, 
Taney justified conquest through the existence of sovereignty.63 Re-
gardless of the origin of the power, the federal government began to 
use it aggressively after Rogers was decided. It created the reserva-
tion system, which gave the executive a power to confine and con-
trol Native people so absolute that some academics believe it in-
spired the Nazis.64 It also took children from their families and sent 
them to federal boarding schools in order to “[k]ill the Indian and 
save the man.”65 From the 1840’s on, the federal government turned 
to plenary power to solve the “Indian problem.”66 
C. Build That Wall: Manifest Destiny and the United 
States/Mexico Border 
Considering the ire that migrants generate by “illegally” cross-
ing the southern border,67 it is worth examining the violence through 
 
 60 Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572. 
 61 Id. For a detailed discussion of Rogers and the plenary power doctrine, see 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, 
and the Nineteeth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 
TEX. L. REV 1, 46–47 (2002). 
 62 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
 63 See Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572. 
 64 Blackhawk, supra note 9, at 1830. 
 65 Id. at 1831. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See, e.g. Tucker Carlson, Opinion, Tucker Carlson: Why No One Ever 
Makes the Economic Case for Mass Immigration, FOX NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-why-no-one-ever-makes-the-
economic-case-for-mass-immigration (arguing that immigration from Mexico 
and Central America “makes our own country poorer, dirtier and more divided”) 
(emphasis added); Peggy Grande, Opinion, Immigration: The Conversation We 
Need To Be Having Around America’s Kitchen Table—But Aren’t, FOX NEWS 
(Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/immigration-the-conversa-
tion-we-need-to-be-having-around-americas-kitchen-tables-but-arent (arguing 
that immigrants do not deserve tax money because “[i]t’s time for ‘We the People’ 
to participate in determining the future of these caravan migrants, [sic] and other 
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which the settlers established the border in the first place.68 One of 
the pillars of settler colonialism is the “presumption of sovereign 
entitlement” over land to which settlers have never been.69 Once this 
presumption is justified,70 what would more accurately be described 
as crimes against humanity instead become Manifest Destiny.71 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a crime against humanity as fol-
lows: 
A brutal crime that is not an isolated incident but that 
involves large and systematic actions, often cloaked 
with official authority, and that shocks the con-
science of humankind; an inhumane act such as per-
secution on political, racial, or religious grounds, re-
gardless of whether it is permitted by the domestic 
law of the country where perpetrated. Among the 
specific crimes that fall within this category are mass 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
and other inhumane acts perpetrated against a popu-
lation, whether in wartime or not.72 
The zeitgeist of the early republic (and, for that matter, of today) 
was that the United States must naturally expand “from sea to shin-
ing sea,” which necessitated the extermination and deportation of 
Indigenous peoples.73 Such a paradigm comes part and parcel with 
the idea of terra nullius.74  Indeed, the United States utilized the ex-
act same rhetoric about the superiority of European civilization to 
 
immigrants”); Laura Ingraham, Opinion, Laura Ingraham: Immigration Truths 
the Democrats Deny, FOX NEWS (Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/laura-ingraham-immigration-truths-the-dem-
ocrats-deny (arguing that “[w]hen [Mexican and Central American migrants] il-
legally cross our borders, whether they come to work or to collect welfare, using 
false documents, whether they come to deal drugs or join murderous gangs that 
are already here, this does constitute a foreign enemy action”) (emphasis added). 
 68 See DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 117–133. 
 69 Saito, supra note 9, at 25. 
 70 See supra Section I.A. 
 71 See Twibell, supra note 47, at 152 n.109. 
 72 Crime Against Humanity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (11th ed. 2019) 
(emphasis added). 
 73 DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 117–133. 
 74 Terra nullius, Latin for “the land of no one,” is used to describe land that 
does not belong to any country. Terra nullius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (11th 
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justify the conquest of Northern Mexico as it did to justify conquest 
of other Indigenous lands.75 An observer of the West before the 
Mexican-American war postulated “[t]hat the Indian race of Mexico 
must recede before us, is quite as certain as that . . . is the destiny of 
our own Indians.”76 With this perspective as central, rather than tan-
gential, to U.S. history, the anger around “border invasions” no 
longer appears to be a glitch in a nation of immigrants. It is the in-
evitable consequence of a colony of settlers. 
The United States invaded Mexico in 1846 in order to fulfill its 
so-called manifest destiny.77 In 1848, the war ended with Mexico 
ceding its northern territories in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.78 
As the newly seized territories became states, one of the conditions 
for statehood was that the settler population outnumber the Indige-
nous population.79 The presumption of sovereignty over the western 
United States, like the eastern United States, involved the presump-
tion that forced removal and genocide were a natural part of human 
progress.80 Following the Mexican-American war, the federal gov-
ernment used military enforcement to push westward and protect the 
settlers from the Indians.81 As President Jackson had previously 
noted, laws of war “did not apply to conflicts with savages.”82 
Because the Spanish had mainly colonized Mexico with sol-
diers, rather than settler-families, the Mexican population remained 
largely of Indigenous or mixed descent.83 Furthermore, following 
Mexican independence from Spain, roughly ten thousand Indige-
nous people from the eastern United States fled to Mexico to escape 
forced removal to Indian Country.84 But for the southern border, the 
Indigenous peoples of Mexico and the Indigenous peoples of the 
 
ed. 2019). The popular imagination treats the United States as terra nullius before 
European conquest. E.g. DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 2. 
 75 DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 117–18. 
 76 Id. at 117 (quoting WADDY THOMPSON, RECOLLECTIONS OF MEXICO 239 
(1846)). 
 77 Id. at 118. 
 78 Id. at 123. 
 79 Id. at 124. 
 80 Id. 
 81 WILLIAM S. KISER, COAST-TO-COAST EMPIRE: MANIFEST DESTINY AND 
THE NEW MEXICO BORDERLANDS 75–77 (2018). 
 82 Blackhawk, supra note 9, at 1827. 
 83 DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 125. 
 84 Id. at 126. 
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Southwest have largely the same ancestry.85  Under this framing, the 
belief that people from below the southern border do not belong in 
the United States is as old as the United States itself. 
D. The Birth of Cowboys and Indians 
It is this era of Westward expansion that gave rise to the Cow-
boys and Indians trope.86 The Western, a genre of built around the 
idea that heroes kill Injuns,87 is inarguably part of U.S. tradition.88 
According to Natsu Taylor Saito, “warfare between Indigenous peo-
ples and settlers is central to the origin stories of most settler socie-
ties—certainly that of the United States.”89 The protagonists of these 
stories pursued the noble calling of taming the uncivilized.90 The 
land in the West, having been successfully procured from Indige-
nous people by the Spanish and then by the United States, could not 
be left to the savages.91 The settlers had rightful dominion.92 
The ruggedness, individualism, and moral clarity of the cowboy 
heroes infatuated the U.S. audience.93 To be “American,” as these 
stories tell it, is to take risks, to do what is right, and to conquer the 
frontier.94 The Western poster-boy himself, John Wayne, was an un-
surprising choice to speak at the 1968 Republican National Conven-
tion. He delivered a speech called “Why I am Proud to be an Amer-
ican.”95 
 
 85 Id. at 125–26. 
 86 WARD CHURCHILL, FANTASIES OF THE MASTER RACE 168 (2d ed. 1998). 
 87 See id. at 178–79. 
 88 Id. at 167–68; see also Allen Rostron, The Law and Order Theme in Polit-
ical and Popular Culture, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 323, 337 (2012) (“The na-
tion’s frontier past continued to dominate both popular entertainment and political 
imaginations in the 1960s. Hollywood turned out a steady stream of Western mov-
ies, while programs like Bonanza, Gunsmoke, and The Virginian filled a large part 
of the prime-time television schedule.”). 
 89 Saito, supra note 9, at 26. 
 90 Rostron, supra note 88, at 338. 
 91 Saito, supra note 9, at 35. 
 92 Rostron, supra note 88, at 338 (“The Western hero’s function was to tame 
the uncivilized land, by grit and gun, clearing the way for the institutions of Amer-
ican law, politics, and society.”). 
 93 See id. at 338–39. 
 94 Id. at 337–38. 
 95 Id. at 341. 
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E. Redskins, Seminoles, and Indians: Native America in the 
Contemporary National Psyche 
None of this is to say that conditions now are the same as they 
were in the nineteenth century. The United States has achieved 
many milestones, such as abolishing slavery, giving white women 
the right to vote, granting Indigenous people citizenship, granting 
other civil rights, et cetera.96 However, for proof that “Native Amer-
ica” continues to symbolize “who we are not,”97 this Note could look 
to a number of places. It could look to poverty rates and life expec-
tancy.98 It could look to the Dakota Access Pipeline for proof that at 
this very moment the reasoning in the Marshall Trilogy and Rogers 
is alive and well.99 And, of course, it could look a game of Cowboys 
 
 96 Indigenous people were not granted citizenship until the Indian Citizenship 
Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012)). Throughout the 
South, people of color were systematically denied suffrage until the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2012)). The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, 
therefore in practice did not apply to Indigenous women or many other women of 
color. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV n.11. Progress notwithstanding, many argue 
that similar anti-democratic practices continue today. E.g., Tristin Brown & Elijah 
Staggers, Preface, Lessons from the 2018 Midterm Election and How to Protect 
Minority Voting Rights Post-Shelby County v. Holder, 10 GEO. J.L. & MOD. 
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 91, 92 (2018) (introducing a special issue exploring argu-
ments that “protections for minority voting rights are largely inadequate, and can-
didates can now openly wage racist attacks on their minority opponents.”). 
 97 See KING, supra note 12, at xi. 
 98 See Saito, supra note 9, at 38–39. In 2005, half of Indigenous people living 
on or near reservations were unemployed. Id. at 38. Of those who were not, 29% 
earned below the poverty line. Id. Among what Saito considers “predictable re-
sults” of these economic realities are disproportionately high infant mortality 
rates, suicide rates, rates of death from disease, and generally low life expectancy. 
Id. at 39. 
 99 See Jeff Brady, Two Years After Standing Rock Protests, Tensions Remain 
But Oil Business Booms, NPR (Nov. 29, 2018, 7:20 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/11/29/671701019/2-years-after-standing-rock-pro-
tests-north-dakota-oil-business-is-booming (“Two years ago in North Dakota, af-
ter months of protest by thousands of Indigenous and environmental activists, 
pipeline opponents celebrated when the Obama administration denied a key per-
mit for the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). A few months later, the Trump ad-
ministration reversed that decision and approved construction”); Robinson 
Meyer, The Legal Case for Blocking the Dakota Access Pipeline, ATLANTIC (Sept. 
9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/09/dapl-dakota-
sitting-rock-sioux/499178/ (“The tribe and its legal team say that less than 24 
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and Indians.100 To save some time, however, it will look to the most 
every-day example one could find—the world of sports. 
The Washington Redskins, while the most egregious example of 
Indigenous dehumanization in athletics, is by no means the only ex-
ample.101 “Redskin” is a pejorative term, but the team refuses to fol-
low the advice of Merriam-Webster: “[t]he word redskin is very of-
fensive and should be avoided.”102 This slur does not refer to the 
color of Indigenous skin, but rather “the mutilated and bloody 
corpses [settlers] left in the wake of scalp-hunts.”103 Blatant racism 
notwithstanding, Redskins owner Dan Snyder has repeatedly shut 
down the idea of changing the name.104 
Even among team names that are not hate speech,105 employing 
imagery of Indigenous people as mascots is res ipsa loquitur white 
supremacy. Mascots are typically animals, sometimes abstract con-
cepts, but rarely human beings.106 In fact, the Spanish word for pet 
is mascota.107 Of the teams that do chose human mascots, they are 
 
hours after evidence of the new sacred sites were provided to the court, the Dakota 
Access company began construction on those same exact sites, perhaps destroying 
many of them forever”). 
 100 See supra Section I.D. 
 101 See, e.g., Hayley Munguia, The 2,128 Native American Mascots People 
Aren’t Talking About, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 5, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-2128-native-american-mascots-people-
arent-talking-about/. 
 102 Redskin, MERRIAM-WEBSTER LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.learn-
ersdictionary.com/definition/redskin (last visited Dec. 28, 2019). 
 103 DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 65. 
 104 Kevin Skiver, Roger Goodell: Redskins Aren’t Changing Name After Indi-
ans Retire Chief Wahoo, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 30, 2018, 1:22 PM), 
https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/roger-goodell-redskins-arent-changing-
name-after-indians-retire-chief-wahoo/; Erik Brady, Daniel Snyder Says Redskins 
Will Never Change Name, USA TODAY, https://www.usato-
day.com/story/sports/nfl/redskins/2013/05/09/washington-redskins-daniel-
snyder/2148127/ (last updated May 10, 2013, 8:14 AM).  
 105 See Munguia, supra note 101 (listing sports teams named after tribe names, 
among other names).   
 106 See Allison L Thomasseau, Top Ten Most Common High School Mascots, 
USA TODAY (Oct. 21, 2014, 12:53 PM), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/sports/high-school/2014/10/21/common-high-school-mas-
cots/17662249/ (listing eagles, bulldogs, and tigers as the three most common 
mascots).  
 107 Mascota [Pet], REAL ACADEMIA ESPAÑOLA [ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY], 
http://dle.rae.es/?id=OWl1ptF (last visited Dec. 28, 2019). 
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typically of a bygone era meant to harken back to a romanticized, 
warrior past.108 Conceptualizing Indigenous people in this category 
is, by its very nature, dehumanizing. While some teams try to sani-
tize their appropriated mascots,109 the thing speaks for itself. Indig-
enous people as sports mascots makes sense, if, like Chief Justice 
John Marshall, one considers them “fierce savages, whose occupa-
tion [is] war.”110 This Note argues that the persistence of such im-
agery is the most visible testament to the persistence of such reason-
ing in the national consciousness. 
II. NO RIGHT WAY: THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF 
DESCENDANTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES FROM U.S. IMMIGRATION 
LAW 
If still you think me mad, you will think so no longer 
when I describe the wise precautions I took for the 
concealment of the body.111 
Having briefly established settler colonialism a paradigm 
through which to view life in the contemporary United States, Part 
II turns to what this means for immigration law. Immigrants, unlike 
settlers, do not presume sovereignty or superior civilization.112 Mi-
gration is not, as some fear, a “foreign enemy action.”113 Whether 
 
 108 See Thomasseau, supra note 106 (listing the Vikings among top ten high 
school mascots). 
 109 The Florida State University (“FSU”) “Seminoles” are a particularly inter-
esting example of a futile attempt to reconcile with the reasons Indigenous people 
are considered mascots. FSU insists that it “does not have a mascot,” but rather a 
relationship with the Florida Seminole Tribe built on mutual respect. University 
Communications: Relationship with the Seminole Tribe of Florida, FLORIDA 
STATE UNIVERSITY, https://unicomm.fsu.edu/messages/relationship-seminole-
tribe-florida/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2019). However, whether the university de-
cides to use the word “mascot” or not, Seminole traditions are employed to gal-
vanize a crowd at sporting events. Id. No amount of historical accuracy or “mutual 
respect” can change the fact that the university is conceptualizing Indigenous peo-
ple as suitable material for a mascot. Res ipsa loquitur. 
 110 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823). 
 111 EDGAR ALLEN POE, The Tell-Tale Heart, in SELECTED POEMS, TALES, AND 
ESSAYS 173, 176 (Jared Gardner & Elizabeth Hewitt, eds. 2016). 
 112 See Saito, supra note 9, at 27. 
 113 Ingraham, supra note 67. 
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they enter with documentation or without it, immigrants accept the 
U.S. government as a legitimate authority. The popular hysteria 
around the fear that non-white newcomers—particularly those In-
digenous to other parts of the Americas—will replace “real Ameri-
cans”114 is akin to the hysteria of Edgar Allen Poe’s The Tell-Tale 
Heart.115 Like the madman narrator of the poem, the contemporary 
United States is standing atop the grave of its own victim. The beat-
ing of the proverbial heart manifests itself in chants of “BUILD 
THAT WALL;”116 despite having gotten away with the crime, the 
country cannot escape its madness. In practical terms, this paranoia 
amounts to hateful rhetoric about “invasions” of immigrants “taking 
our country,”117 which has already been rightfully stolen. 
A.  No Border, No Country: The White Supremacist Roots of 
the Power to Exclude 
“So, you believe in ‘No border, no wall, no USA at all?’ . . . Be-
cause if you do, why are you here? Because if you don’t support 
America, why are you here?”118 At the same anti-immigrant rally 
where protesters asked Navajo Representative Descheenie if he was 
an “illegal,” protesters also espoused the idea that to be anti-border 
is to be anti-American.119 This logic is nothing new.120 Since settlers 
arrived on this continent, they have been afraid that other groups of 
people will try to take it from them.121 This fear is arguably a rational 
response from a group of people who base their sovereignty on vio-
lent land-theft, and it remains a part of the national consciousness.122 
Interestingly, however, the power to exclude appears nowhere in the 
 
 114 See supra notes 1, 3, & 67 and accompanying text. 
 115 POE, supra note 111, at 173–78. 
 116 Fox 10 Phoenix, “BUILD THAT WALL!” Donald Trump Chants After Ma-
jor Endorsement, YOUTUBE (May 26, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=ZGSAhNZnisk (crowd chanting, with Donald Trump joining in, 
“BUILD THAT WALL!” at 2:01–2:25).  
 117 See infra Part III.C. 
 118 Giles & Pineda, supra note 1. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See Saito, supra note 9, at 58–64. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See supra Part I. 
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Constitution.123 With reasoning—and racism—strikingly similar to 
both the Arizona protesters124 and Chief Justice Taney’s justification 
for conquest in Rogers,125 the Court inferred the power to exclude a 
century after the founding of the United States.126 
The case in controversy that led the Court to infer the federal 
government’s power to bar noncitizens from the United States was 
a challenge to the Chinese Exclusion Act.127 Congress reacted to the 
“great danger” that California would be “overrun” by Chinese im-
migrants who brought unwanted competition and “differences of 
race” by restricting Chinese immigration.128 U.S. citizens at the time 
worried that “[Chinese] immigration was in numbers approaching 
the character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to our civi-
lization.”129 That any sovereign government must be able to exclude 
“foreigners of a different race” was, to the Court, self-evident in re-
sponse to this threat.130 
And yet, the Supreme Court’s citation for the proposition of the 
power to exclude is unorthodox at best.131 The ability of the federal 
 
 123 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595–610 (1889) (hold-
ing that the very existence of sovereignty gives the federal government the power 
to exclude aliens of a different race who cannot assimilate). 
 124 Giles & Pineda, supra note 1. 
 125 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846). 
 126 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595–610. Clearly, the Chinese Exclusion Act 
did not deal with immigration from Mexico and Central America, as this Note 
focuses on. However, it is by no means true that immigrants from the other parts 
of the Americas are the only immigrants to suffer from U.S. settler-colonial his-
tory. Rather, it argues that the seemingly contradictory U.S. immigration policy 
is illuminated when viewed through a settler-colonial lens. The white settlers who 
justified conquering the West with the idea that they were a superior civilization 
not only needed to remove the “savages” already there, they also needed to pre-
vent other non-white peoples from “taking” the territory. See Saito, supra note 9, 
at 58–64. 
 127 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 589. 
 128 Id. at 595. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 606. 
 131 Compare id. at 603 (“That the government of the United States, through 
the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a 
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own 
territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its 
independence.”), with United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) 
(“It would be useless at this day to inquire whether the principle thus adopted is 
just or not; or to speak of the manner in which the power claimed was in many 
540 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:520 
 
government to keep certain people out of its territory, like the ability 
of the federal government to dominate Indigenous peoples, flows 
not from the Constitution but from independence itself.132 “If [the 
federal government] could not exclude aliens it would be to that ex-
tent subject to the control of another power.”133 By the mere fact that 
the United States is a sovereign nation, it must have this power.134 
The Court goes on to list a number of other powers associated with 
sovereignty—declaring war, making treaties, quashing insurrec-
tions, regulating foreign commerce135—which are all actually listed 
in the Constitution.136 In an impressive feat of legal acrobatics, the 
Court finds that because the United States has enumerated sovereign 
powers, it must be sovereign, and if it is sovereign, it must have the 
power to exclude noncitizens.137 As such, it does not matter that this 
particular power is not enumerated in the Constitution, because it 
flows from the mere existence of sovereignty.138 To be less verbose, 
“No border, no wall, no USA at all?”139 The Court found the power 
to exclude obvious because it was obvious that the federal govern-
ment must be able to keep out people of a different race.140 What is 
taken for granted as a legitimate government function141 is inextri-
cably tied to unabashed racism. 
 
instances exercised. . . . from the very moment the general government came into 
existence to this time, it has exercised its power over this unfortunate race . . .”). 
 132 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603. 
 133 Id. at 604. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 604–05. 
 136 U.S. CONST. arts. I, §§ 8, 10 (giving Congress the power to regulate foreign 
commerce, declare war, suppress insurrections, and enter treaties). 
 137 Id. 
 138 See id. 
 139 Giles & Pineda, supra note 1. 
 140 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (“If, therefore, the government of the 
United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of for-
eigners of a different race in this country . . . to be dangerous to its peace and 
security, their exclusion is not to be stayed . . .”). 
 141 Jane C. Timm, Sessions Defends ‘Zero Tolerance’ Border Policy, New 
Asylum Restrictions, NBC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2018, 11:44 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/sessions-defends-zero-toler-
ance-border-policy-new-asylum-restrictions-n908121. Then-Attorney General 
Jefferson B. Sessions defended the controversial zero-tolerance policy by explain-
ing that “[n]o great and prosperous nation can have both a generous welfare sys-
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B.  Just Wait in Line: Access to Immigration Laws 
One of the main criticisms of “illegal” immigration is that it is 
well, illegal—it flouts the rule of law.142 The argument typically fol-
lows some version of the following: why don’t they just wait in line 
and enter legally, like my ancestors did!?143 As demonstrated below, 
unlike the (typically white)144 ancestors of those prone to making 
this argument, almost no legal avenues exist for Mexican and Cen-
tral American migrants. This is a cruel irony, to first ensure that no 
legal immigration is possible and then decry people for not immi-
grating legally.145 Implicit in this argument is the idea that if one 
cannot immigrate legally, one should not immigrate at all.146 As-
suming arguendo that migrants from Mexico and Central America 
did just “wait in line,” the current administration is continuously 
narrowing147 their already limited options while faulting them for 
not following the law. 
1. “CHAIN MIGRATION:” FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRATION 
Congress must end chain migration so that we can 
have a system that is SECURITY BASED! We need 
to make AMERICA SAFE! #USA148 
 
tem and great prosperity, and open borders. Such a policy is radical, it’s danger-
ous . . . so it must be rejected out of hand, and the American people have done 
so.” Id.  
 142 E.g. Jay Webber, Opinion, The Real Meaning of American Citizenship, 
FOX NEWS (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/the-real-meaning-
of-american-citizenship (arguing naturalized citizens, unlike “illegal” immi-
grants, show “love of our country and a respect for the rule of law”). 
 143 See, e.g. Jenna Amatull, Tomi Lahren Hits Back at Genealogist Who Re-
searched Her Family, Misses the Point, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2018, 12:57 
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/tomi-lahren-tries-to-clap-back-at-
genealogist-misses-the-point_us_5afaea6ce4b044dfffb60765 (rebutting Fox 
News contributor Tomi Lahren’s argument that her family’s history of “legal” 
immigration distinguishes her from today’s immigrants). 
 144 Id. 
 145 See infra Part III. 
 146 See infra Part III. 
 147 See infra Part III. 
 148 Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 2, 2017, 11:43 
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/926157911151214592?lang=en. 
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The most common type of “legal” immigration is through family 
petitioning.149 President Trump and those who share his worldview 
disparage this path as “chain migration,” falsely claiming that it al-
lows one person to bring her entire extended family.150 In reality, 
family-based immigration is a complicated, lengthy, and expensive 
process, available to only the lucky few with qualifying relatives.151 
a. Defining Family: Immediate Relatives and 
Preference Categories 
While the name is relatively self-explanatory, family-based im-
migration requires that an intending immigrant have a family mem-
ber that is already a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident 
 
 149 Legal Immigration Report and Status Quarterly Data, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., (April 9, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statis-
tics/special-reports/legal-immigration (citing figures from Table 1B). Apart from 
asylum, discussed infra Section III.A, the other legal routes to immigrate to the 
United States are employment-based immigration and the diversity lottery. 8 
U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2012). Although there are many immigrant and nonimmigrant 
employment-based visas, nearly all require high levels of education, which gives 
an advantage to noncitizens from developed countries. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b); 
see also Grace H. Parsons, Note, An Overview of the US Immigration System and 
Comparison with Merit-Based Immigration Systems in Light of the Proposed 
Raise, 35 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 469, 478–81 (2018). President Trump wants 
to make this the main form of immigration. Donald J. Trump, (@real-
DonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 2, 2017, 11:29 AM), https://twitter.com/real-
donaldtrump/status/892814520942460928?lang=en (“I campaigned on creating a 
merit-based immigration system that protects U.S. workers & taxpayers.”) The 
diversity lottery provides a small number of immigrant visas for people who do 
not qualify in any other category. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(3). President Trump wants 
to abolish it. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2018, 
3:26 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/sta-
tus/961743032952459264?lang=en (“Time to end the visa lottery.”); see also 
Glenn Kessler, President Trump’s Consistent Misrepresentation of How the Di-




 150 President Donald J. Trump, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on 
the State of the Union (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.govinfo.gov/con-
tent/pkg/DCPD-201800064/pdf/DCPD-201800064.pdf, at 6 [hereinafter 2018 
State of the Union Address]. 
 151 See Parsons, supra note 149, at 475–78. 
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(“LPR”).152 Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are at a distinct ad-
vantage, as they are not subject to annual quotas and can therefore 
have their petitions processed immediately.153 However, unlike the 
President has claimed,154 merely having legal status does not mean 
a person can bring her entire extended family.155 “Immediately fam-
ily members” are statutorily defined as children, parents, and 
spouses of U.S. citizens.156  “Children” are defined as unmarried and 
under twenty-one years of age, with further stipulations for children 
who are born out of wedlock, adopted, or stepchildren.157 “Parents” 
only qualify as immediate relatives if the U.S. citizen petitioner is 
over twenty-one.158 
The other possible route for family-based immigration is the 
“preference categories” of relationships with U.S. citizens or 
LPRs.159 There are four preference categories.160 The first is for un-
married sons or daughters of U.S. citizens.161 An intending immi-
grant is a “son or daughter,” rather than a “child,” if he or she is over 
twenty-one years old.162 The second preference category is the only 
category in which an LPR can petition for a family member.163 The 
2A category is for spouses and children (unmarried and under 
twenty-one, as defined by the statute).164 The 2B category is for un-
married sons or daughters who are at least twenty-one years old.165 
No preference category exists for married sons or daughters of 
LPRs.166 The third preference category is married sons or daughters 
of U.S. citizens, and does not factor in their age.167 The fourth and 
 
 152 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a). 
 153 § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 154 2018 State of the Union Address, supra note 150, at 6. 
 155 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a). 
 156 § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 157 §1101(b)(1). 
 158 § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). Notably, this statute complicates the fearmongering 
around the “anchor baby.” See infra Section II.B.1.b. 
 159 § 1153(a). 
 160 Id. 
 161 § 1153(a)(1). 
 162 See § 1101(b)(1). 
 163 § 1153(a)(2). 
 164 Id.; § 1101(b)(1). 
 165 § 1153 (a)(2). 
 166 See § 1153(a). 
 167 § 1153(a)(3). 
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final preference category is for brothers and sisters of U.S. citi-
zens.168 The sponsoring U.S. citizen must be at least twenty-one to 
petition for the fourth preference category.169 
Unlike immediate family members of U.S. citizens,170 intending 
immigrants in preference categories have to wait in one of the 
“lines” to which opponents of undocumented immigrants seem to be 
referring. The “line,” which is actually called the visa bulletin, is 
based on the date United States Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices (“USCIS”) receives the petition.171 The wait time varies by 
country and shows some extraordinary delays. As of June 2019, 
USCIS was approving F3 and F4 applications filed from the Philip-
pines in 1997.172 The listing does not always progress chronologi-
cally—if the applicants in a category fill their quota, the priority date 
could move backward.173 
The current head of state claims that “distant family mem-
bers”174 are taking advantage of this system. However, if relatives 
of citizens or LPRs are neither immediate family members nor in 
any of the preference categories, they have no family-based options 
for immigration.175 
b. Much Ado About Nothing: “Anchor Babies” and 
the Unlawful Presence Bar 
At the same time opponents of immigration disparage those who 
thwart the labyrinth of the system, they also denounce those who 
they perceive as trying to use it in ways of which they do not ap-
prove. Opponents of immigration complain about so-called “anchor 
 
 168 § 1153(a)(4). 
 169 §1151(a) (2012). 
 170 § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 171 BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN: 
IMMIGRANT NUMBERS FOR JUNE 2019, at 1 (2019), https://travel.state.gov/con-
tent/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_june2019.pdf [hereinafter VISA BULLETIN]. 
 172 Id. at 2. 
 173 Id. at 1 (“If it becomes necessary during the monthly allocation process to 
retrogress a final action date, supplemental requests for numbers will be honored 
only if the priority date falls within the new final action date announced in this 
bulletin.”). 
 174 2018 State of the Union Address, supra note 150, at 6. 
 175 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a). 
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babies.”176 In fact, President Trump has gone so far as to threaten to 
upend the Fourteenth Amendment to deal with this “problem.”177 
“Anchor babies,” besides being an unnecessarily crass way to 
refer to innocent children, would have a wait time for bringing their 
relatives comparable to a Filipino in the fourth preference cate-
gory—long.178 As shown above, a U.S. citizen child cannot petition 
for her parents until she turns twenty-one years old.179 While having 
a U.S. citizen child could technically provide a path to lawful resi-
dency, the process would take over two decades.180 
Even if an undocumented parent of a U.S. citizen did wait the 
twenty-one years until his child could petition for him, he would still 
trigger the unlawful presence bar.181 The unlawful presence bar is a 
penalty for being in the United States without valid status.182 If a 
noncitizen leaves the United States after accruing six months of un-
lawful presence, he is prohibited from reentering for three years.183 
After one year of unlawful presence, the ban increases to ten 
years.184 
The unlawful presence bar becomes important because an appli-
cant must interview for his visa with the Department of State at a 
consulate or embassy in his home country.185 Known as consular 
 
 176 See, e.g. John Binder, Watch–Tucker Carlson: If Children of Illegal Aliens 
Are Given U.S. Citizenship, Why Should I Pay Taxes?, BREITBART (Aug. 15, 
2018), https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2018/08/15/watch-tucker-carlson-if-
children-of-illegal-aliens-are-given-u-s-citizenship-why-should-i-pay-taxes/. 
 177 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, President Wants to Use Executive Order to End 
Birthright Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/10/30/us/politics/trump-birthright-citizenship.html; see also 
Reena Flores, Donald Trump: “Anchor Babies” Aren’t American Citizens, CBS 
NEWS (Aug. 19, 2015, 10:44 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-
trump-anchor-babies-arent-american-citizens/. 
 178 See VISA BULLETIN, supra note 171, at 1 (announcing a wait time of 
twenty-two years for relatives of Filipino citizens in the fourth preference cate-
gory); 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 179 § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 180 Id. 
 181 See § 1182(a)(9)(B). 
 182 Id. 
 183 § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). 
 184 § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). 
 185 § 1201(a)(1). 
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processing,186 this is the only way for someone who entered the 
United States without documentation to gain lawful status.187 Alt-
hough he could apply for a waiver of the unlawful presence bar, he 
would need to show extreme hardship to a qualifying U.S. citizen 
(not to himself).188 The extreme hardship standard is notoriously dif-
ficult to meet.189 An undocumented parent of an “anchor baby” 
would have to wait twenty-one years before his child could petition 
for him190 and another ten before he could reenter the United States 
after processing the visa.191 Nevertheless, President Trump has 
threatened the integrity of Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizen-
ship to deal with a problem that doesn’t even exist.192 
For all the talk about rule of law, the only feasible ways to im-
migrate legally are to have family member with status (a Catch-22 
in itself) or to be highly educated and have a job offer.193 Most peo-
ple cannot use rules that were simply not designed to allow them 
in,194 and even an imagined attempt to find a loophole is met with 
 
 186 Consular Processing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/consular-processing (last updated May 3, 
2018).  
 187 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1) (in-country “adjustment of status” is available only 
to noncitizens who entered the United States with inspection). 
 188 § 1182(h)(1)(B). 
 189 See In re Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 560, 565–66 (B.I.A. 1999). 
The factors deemed relevant in determining extreme hardship 
to a qualifying relative include, but are not limited to, the fol-
lowing: the presence of lawful permanent resident or United 
States citizen family ties to this country; the qualifying rela-
tive’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the 
country or countries to which the qualifying relative would re-
locate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties to such 
countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; 
and, finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when 
tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country 
to which the qualifying relative would relocate.  
Id. 
 190 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 191 § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 192 Davis, supra note 177. 
 193 See supra text accompanying note 149. 
 194 See supra text accompanying note 149. 
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anger and indignation.195 Underlying this talk is a clear message: We 
do not want you here. You do not belong in our country. 
2. ASYLUM LAW OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Asylum, withholding of removal (“withholding”), and protec-
tion under The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) are the immi-
gration laws most likely to apply to Mexican and Central American 
migrants.196 These laws are based in the principle of non-re-
foulement, a pillar of both domestic197 and international law under 
which it is illegal to return any person to a country in which she fears 
persecution or torture.198 Following the Holocaust, the international 
community codified non-refoulement in the 1951 United Nations 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.199 The UN later 
adapted the definition of “refugee” by removing limits on time and 
geography.200 Domestically, Congress passed the Refugee Act in 
1980 with the explicit intention of ensuring U.S. law conformed 
with the Protocol.201 
Asylum, the most generous of the non-refoulement laws,202 is a 
discretionary relief from deportation. 203 A grant of asylum provides 
a path to permanent residency204 and allows asylees to bring spouses 
 
 195 See, e.g., Binder, supra note 176. 
 196 8 U.S.C. § 1158; 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13, 208.16(b), 208.16(c) (2018). 
 197 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13, 208.16(b), 208.16(c). 
 198 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CONVENTION AND 
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 3–4 (1967), https://www.un-
hcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-
refugees.html. 
 199 Id. at 2. 
 200 Id. at 3. 
 201 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1521 (2012)); see also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the 
new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Con-
gress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance 
with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . .”). 
 202 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012). 
 203 § 1158(b)(1)(A). 
 204 § 1159(a)(1). 
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and children.205 Regardless of how an individual entered the coun-
try, if she has a demonstrated fear of returning to her homeland, she 
is entitled to an opportunity to present her case.206 An asylum appli-
cant has the high burden207 of showing that she meets the statutory 
definition of a refugee: 
The term “refugee” means . . . any person who is out-
side any country of such person’s nationality or, in 
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually re-
sided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, 
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself 
of the protection of, that country because of persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion.208 
The applicant therefore must show 1) a well-founded fear209 2) 
of treatment that rises to the level of persecution210 3) with a clear 
nexus between the persecution and the protected class211 and 4) that 
 
 205 § 1158(b)(3). 
 206 § 1158(a)(1). 
 207 § 1158(b)(1)(B). 
 208 § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 209 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
440 (1987) (establishing standard for “well-founded fear” can be as low as 10% 
chance of persecution). 
 210 Hussain v. Holder, 576 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2009) (“To qualify as perse-
cution, a person’s experience must rise above unpleasantness, harassment, and 
even basic suffering.”) (quoting Jorgji v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 
2008)). 
 211 In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 338 (A.G. 2018) (“Establishing the re-
quired nexus between past persecution and membership in a particular social 
group is a critical step for victims of private crime who seek asylum.”). 
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her government is “unable or unwilling” to protect her.212 If the ap-
plicant meets her burden,213 she was never “firmly resettled” else-
where,214 no bilateral or multilateral agreement will allow the United 
States to send her to a “safe third country,”215 and she is not other-
wise inadmissible to the United States,216 the Attorney General may, 
in his discretion, grant asylum.217 
III. LIVES WORTH SAVING: 2018–2019 AND THE CULMINATION 
OF THE FAILURES OF ASYLUM LAW 
Although the federal government has spent the last two decades 
narrowing the availability of asylum as a relief from deportation, the 
Trump administration is doing so rapidly and unapologetically.218 
Among the more jarring examples was the “zero tolerance policy” 
that dominated the headlines with images of toddlers ripped from 
their parents.219 However, as shown below, the administration has 
also made it nearly impossible for applicants from Mexico and Cen-
tral America to win an asylum case on the merits. Since 2018, the 
executive has, inter alia, narrowed the class of people who qualify 
as refugees, forced a group of asylum-seekers to wait in Mexico 
while their claims are processed, effectively barred claims from any 
country south of Mexico, and stripped due process protections from 
thousands of migrants.220 Utilizing a settler-colonial perspective, it 
 
 212 Id. at 318 (“The prototypical refugee flees her home country because the 
government has persecuted her—either directly through its own actions or indi-
rectly by being unwilling or unable to prevent the misconduct of non-government 
actors—based upon a statutorily protected ground.”). 
 213 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). 
 214 § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). 
 215 § 1158(a)(2)(A). 
 216 See § 1158(2)(A). 
 217 § 1158(b)(1)(A). 
 218 Kari Hong, Weaponizing Misery: The Twenty-Year Attack on Asylum, 22 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 541, 546–54 (2018). 
 219 See infra Section III.B. 
 220 Advocates are challenging, with some success, executive authority to take 
such actions. See, e.g., Make the Rd. New York v. McAleenan, No. 19-CV-2369 
(KBJ), 2019 WL 4738070, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2019) (granting a preliminary 
injunction against a rule, discussed infra Section III.E, which broadens the class 
of immigrants subject to expedited removal); Grace v. Whitaker, 334 F. Supp. 3d 
96, 105 (D.D.C. 2018) (abrogating In re A-B-, discussed infra Section III.A., in 
550 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:520 
 
becomes clear that legal treatment of migrants of Indigenous descent 
mirrors the legal treatment of Indigenous people north of the border. 
A. In re A-B- and the “Prototypical Refugee” 
While lacking the shock value of babies in cages,221 In re A-B- 
also sent shockwaves through the immigration law community dur-
ing the summer of 2018.222 Then-Attorney General Jefferson B. Ses-
sions used his authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(h)(1) to certify Ms. A.B.’s immigration case to himself.223 
Ms. A.B. is a survivor of domestic violence from El Salvador.224 
Sessions begins with a discussion of his own vast authority over im-
migration law, noting that “the extraordinary and pervasive role that 
the Attorney General plays in immigration matters is virtually 
unique.”225 He then proceeds to reverse Ms. A.B.’s grant of asylum, 
wringing his hands about how he cannot apply the law (over which 
he had just claimed wide discretion) to her particular persecution—
even while acknowledging that she had suffered “vile abuse.”226 
Sessions begins his opinion by describing the “prototypical ref-
ugee” as one who “flees her home country because the government 
has persecuted her—either directly through its own actions or indi-
rectly by being unwilling or unable to prevent the misconduct of 
non-government actions—based upon a statutorily protected 
ground.”227 Ms. A.B. claimed the statutorily protected ground of 
“membership in a particular social group” and described the group 
as “El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic 
 
its application as a bright-line bar in credible fear interviews and expedited re-
movals). 
 221 See infra Section III.B. 
 222 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Katie Benner & Caitlin Dickerson, Ses-
sions Says Domestic and Gang Violence Are Not Grounds for Asylum, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/sessions-do-
mestic-violence-asylum.html. 
 223 In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 323–24. 
 224 Id. at 321. 
 225 Id. at 323 (quoting Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 226 Id. at 346 (“I do not minimize the vile abuse that the respondent reported 
she suffered at the hands of her ex-husband or the harrowing experiences of many 
other victims of domestic violence around the world. . . . But the ‘asylum statute 
is not a general hardship statute.’”) (quoting Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 
199 (4th Cir. 2017) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)). 
 227 Id. at 318. 
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relationships where they have children in common with their part-
ners.”228 Ms. A.B.’s social group was modeled after the group de-
fined in In re A-R-C-G-: “married women in Guatemala who are un-
able to leave their relationship.”229 Sessions used A-B- to overturn 
A-R-C-G-, holding that the latter did not apply a rigorous enough 
definition to a standard that he himself referred to as “ambigu-
ous.”230 He walked through a brief history of the evolution of the 
meaning of “particular social group.231 The current understanding of 
the phrase, articulated in a 2014 precedential opinion from the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), is as follows: “the group is (1) 
composed of members who share a common immutable character-
istic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within 
the society in question.”232 Sessions held that Central American so-
ciety does not view victims of domestic violence as a particular 
group, but rather as individuals in discrete unfortunate circum-
stances.233 He postulated that, under the correct application of the 
law, “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence 
or gang violence perpetrated by non-government actors will not 
qualify for asylum.”234 
Sessions also heightened the standard for when a government is 
“unwilling or unable” to protect against persecution.235 He held that 
an asylum applicant could only meet this burden by showing that the 
government was completely helpless in stopping non-government 
 
 228 Id. at 321. 
 229 Id. at 319 (quoting In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 338, 389 (B.I.A. 2014)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. at 326–33. 
 232 Id. at 330 (quoting In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 
2014)). 
 233 Id. at 336. Here, it is worth mentioning that the grounds for asylum— race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, and membership in a particular social 
group—do not include gender. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). A-R-C-G-, the case 
Sessions overturned, was part of a jurisprudence moving toward recognizing gen-
der as grounds for asylum. For a full discussion, see Karen Musalo, A Short His-
tory of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance and Ambivalence May 
Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 REFUGEE 
SURV. Q. 46 (2010). 
 234 A-B-, 27 I. & N. at 320. 
 235 Id. at 337–39. 
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actors from persecuting on account of protected grounds.236 The 
plain language of the statute articulates a different standard, and 
even the case that Sessions cites for the wording of “complete help-
lessness” actually uses the “unwilling or unable” standard.237 By 
heightening the burden for victims seeking asylum based on vio-
lence by private actors, Sessions attempted to create a de facto cat-
egorical ban for Mexican and Central Americans seeking asylum on 
the basis of domestic or gang violence.238 
Sessions’s disdain for Central American asylum seekers is espe-
cially overt in footnote twelve.239 After stating outright that “[n]ei-
ther the immigration judge nor the Board addressed the issue of dis-
cretion regarding the respondent’s asylum application” (essentially 
admitting his next statement is dictum), Sessions nevertheless went 
on to articulate the following: 
I remind all asylum adjudicators that a favorable ex-
ercise of discretion is a discrete requirement for the 
granting of asylum and should not be presumed or 
glossed over solely because an applicant otherwise 
meets the burden of proof for asylum eligibility un-
der the INA. Relevant discretionary factors include, 
inter alia, the circumvention of orderly refugee pro-
cedures; whether the alien passed through any other 
countries or arrived in the United States directly from 
her country; whether orderly refugee procedures 
were in fact available to help her in any country she 
passed through; whether she made any attempts to 
seek asylum before coming to the United States; the 
length of time the alien remained in a third country; 
 
 236 Id. at 337. 
 237 Id. (quoting Galina v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding 
persecution for the purposes of asylum despite police response in applicant’s 
home country)). 
 238 Benner & Dickerson, supra note 222 (“Attorney General Jeff Sessions . . . 
made it all but impossible for asylum seekers to gain entry into the United States 
by citing fears of domestic abuse or gang violence . . .”). 
 239 A-B-, 27 I. & N. at 345 n.12. 
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and her living conditions, safety, and potential for 
long-term residency there.240 
As an initial matter, under the INA, the manner in which an asy-
lum applicant arrives in the United States is not a factor.241 Once 
present, anyone expressing fear of returning home is entitled to her 
due process rights regarding whether she meets the statutory defini-
tion of a refugee.242 Therefore, turning oneself in at the border and 
expressing fear of return is an “orderly refugee [procedure].”243 
However, the talk about “whether the alien passed through any other 
countries” and the “potential for long-term residency there” seems 
to be a particularly pointed reference to Central American asylum 
seekers.244 The majority arrive on foot, by bus, or by hitchhiking, 
and it is geographically impossible not to pass through at least one 
other country.245 Although the statue does weigh “firm resettle-
ment”246 elsewhere or a “safe third country” option,247 the regula-
tions expressly exempt passing through another country on the way 
to the United States from the criteria.248 By suggesting that even 
those lucky few who manage to meet the artificially-heightened 
standards still do not merit asylum as a matter of discretion, Sessions 
is clearly articulating that he does not want these people in his coun-
try. As discussed infra Part III.D, the executive has now formalized 
this position with a rule prohibiting asylum claims for anyone who 
 
 240 Id. 
 241 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012). 
 242 Id. 
 243 See id. 
 244 See A-B-, 27 I. & N. at 345 n.12. 
 245 See Key Facts About the Migrant and Refugee Caravans Making Their 
Way to the USA, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 16, 2018, 7:12 PM), https://www.am-
nesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/11/key-facts-about-the-migrant-and-refugee-cara-
vans-making-their-way-to-the-usa/. 
 246 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). 
 247 § 1158(a)(2)(A). 
 248 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2018) (exception to “firm resettlement” if passing 
through that country “was a necessary consequence of his or her flight from per-
secution.”). 
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passes through another country without applying and with the iron-
ically named “safe third country” treaties with Guatemala, El Salva-
dor, and Honduras.249 
B.  Babies in Cages: The Zero Tolerance Policy 
Apart from attempting to foreclose asylum as a legal option for 
Mexican and Central American migrants, then-Attorney General 
Sessions was also responsible for the “zero tolerance policy” that 
led to highly publicized family separations.250 As a first-time of-
fense, crossing the border without proper documentation is a misde-
meanor.251 Without warning the relevant agencies, Sessions decided 
to remove prosecutorial discretion and criminally charge all undoc-
umented migrants.252 As the adults were arraigned, their children 
were taken from them.253 After a loud public outcry, Trump signed 
an executive order reversing the policy of separating families.254 
However, Sessions has defended the move as “perfectly legiti-
mate, moral and decent.”255 He claimed that, because of the United 
States’ prosperity, “open borders” would be too radical and danger-
ous of a policy.256 Even though, by his own account, the United 
States has never had open borders, he still defended the zero-toler-
ance policy as necessary to prevent them.257 
 
 249 See Nicole Narea, Trump’s Agreements in Central America are Disman-
tling the Asylum System as We Know It, VOX, 
https://www.vox.com/2019/9/26/20870768/trump-agreement-honduras-guate-
mala-el-salvador-explained (last updated Nov. 20, 2019, 3:08 PM). 
 250 Molly O’Toole, John F. Kelly Says his Tenure as Trump’s Chief of Staff Is 
Best Measured by What the President Did Not Do, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2018, 
3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-john-kelly-exit-interview-
20181230-story.html (quoting former White House Chief of Staff saying that 
“[w]hat happened was Jeff Sessions, he was the one that instituted the zero-toler-
ance process on the border that resulted in both people being detained and the 
family separation”). 
 251 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 
 252 Ron Nixon, ‘Zero Tolerance’ Immigration Policy Surprised Agencies, Re-
port Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2018/10/24/us/politics/immigration-family-separation-zero-tolerance.html. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Timm, supra note 141. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
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C. The “Invasion” of the Migrant Caravan 
Many Gang Members and some very bad people are 
mixed into the Caravan heading to our Southern 
Border. Please go back, you will not be admitted 
into the United States unless you go through the le-
gal process. This is an invasion of our Country and 
our Military is waiting for you! 258 
The advent of the migrant “caravan,” or group of Central Amer-
ican asylum seekers traveling together for safety in numbers,259 has 
produced some of the ugliest rhetoric yet.260 With no evidence—
indeed, despite actual evidence to the contrary261—the Commander-
in-Chief referred to the asylum seekers as an “invasion.”262 Con-
servative commentators have called the caravan a “foreign enemy 
action”263 and a “looming crisis out of the southern border” consist-
ing of many “[b]ad people constantly trying to gain access into our 
country.”264 
President Trump insists the migrants must go through the “legal 
process”265 while ensuring no legal process is available to them.266 
He sent the military to stop unarmed asylum seekers from touching 
 
 258 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, (Oct. 29, 2018, 7:41 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1056919064906469376 [hereinafter 
Trump, Very Bad People]. 
 259 Bryan Mealer, This Is What Trump’s Caravan ‘Invasion’ Really Looks 
Like, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/nov/26/migrant-caravan-disabled-children. 
 260 See supra text accompanying notes 1, 67. 
 261 Mealer, supra note 259. 
 262 Trump, Very Bad People, supra note 258. 
 263 Ingraham, supra note 67. 
 264 Sean Hannity, Opinion, Sean Hannity: The Migrant Caravan and Three 
Simple Questions About What You Believe, FOX NEWS (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/sean-hannity-the-migrant-caravan-and-three-
simple-questions-about-what-you-believe. 
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U.S. soil,267 where he would legally have to provide them due pro-
cess for their claims.268 Although he argues they are not entering 
legally, that is because his administration is narrowing the definition 
of asylum to exclude them.269 Trump and his followers are far less 
concerned with the rule of law than they are with keeping mi-
grants—of mainly Indigenous descent—out of their country. 
D. Come Back Never: “Migrant Protection” and “Safe Third 
Countries” 
In November 2018, Trump issued a proclamation claiming that 
aliens who do not enter through ports of entry may not apply for 
asylum.270 The proclamation runs directly counter to the black-letter 
law: “any alien who is physically present in the United States or who 
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of 
arrival)” may apply for asylum.271 
The administration sharpened its message with what is ironically 
called the Migrant Protection Protocol (“MPP”).272 Under the MPP, 
non-Mexican migrants must wait in Mexico while their asylum 
claims are processed in the United States.273 The MPP was issued in 
January of 2019,274 and the Ninth Circuit lifted a preliminary injunc-
tion in May of the same year.275 In an official statement, the White 
House claimed that MPP was necessary to stem “[t]he flow of illegal 
aliens [that] is crashing our immigration system and overwhelming 
our country.”276 While the MPP theoretically builds in humanitarian 
protections, only 1% of the nearly 9,000 identified asylum seekers 
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on the MPP docket are allowed into the United States.277 Often, they 
are forced to wait in conditions rivaling the danger they fled.278  
The President of the United States is so opposed to asylum seek-
ers that he threatened279—but shortly withdrew280—calls for tariffs 
on Mexico if it could not secure its southern border with Guatemala 
and Belize. In a bizarre turn of events, what President Trump 
claimed as a swift victory in June 2019281 appears to be only a public 
announcement of a deal reached in March.282 Furthermore, despite 
the specter of tariffs, the President failed to procure his desired “safe 
third country” agreement per 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A).283 This 
agreement would have forced non-Mexican asylum seekers to apply 
for asylum in Mexico before being considered in the United 
States.284 Even so, under the deal reached several months before the 
would-be tariffs, Mexico agreed to deploy its National Guard to its 
southern border.285 
The following month, DHS formalized then-Attorney General 
Sessions’s dictum from In re A-B-.286 The Department published an 
interim rule prohibiting any migrant who passed through another 
country and did not apply for asylum there.287 Furthermore, the 
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threat of tariffs288 seems to have worked on Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Honduras.289 The same day the new rule was published, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) 
warned that it is “at variance with international law” and “could re-
sult in the transfer of highly vulnerable individuals to countries 
where they may face life-threatening dangers.”290 Two days later, 
the United States began deporting asylum seekers to have their 
claims adjudicated in Guatemala.291 
E. Expediting Removal 
While essentially ensuring that migrants cannot cross the south-
ern border, the executive has also attempted to strip due process pro-
tections for migrants already in the country. On July 23, 2019, DHS 
promulgated a rule increasing their own power to remove migrants 
without a hearing.292 The process, known as expedited removal, pre-
viously applied to migrants apprehended by Border Patrol within 
one hundred miles of the border and fourteen days of entry.293 The 
new rule increased eligibility for migrants anywhere in the country 
within two years of entry.294 The Department’s brazen attempt to 
force this new rule through without a notice-and-comment period295 
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has been enjoined by the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia.296 
IV. THE BORDER CRISIS AND THE INDIAN PROBLEM: THE DOG 
WHISTLE IN CONSERVATIVE IMMIGRATION RHETORIC 
Conservative immigration rhetoric has a clear underlying mes-
sage to listeners who, like Chief Justices Marshall and Taney and 
Presidents Jackson and Trump, equate U.S. citizenship with white-
ness. Concerns about people who are inherently unfit to be part of 
this country, who are invading it, and who threaten its sovereignty297 
are all reminiscent of past justifications for genocide and forced re-
moval. When Tucker Carlson warned of people who “make our own 
country poorer, dirtier and more divided,”298 he sounded much like 
Chief Justice Marshall when he warned that “[t]o leave them in pos-
session of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness.”299 
When Trump raved over an “invasion” of “very bad people,”300 is 
there really any difference from when Marshall warned of “fierce 
savages, whose occupation was war”?301 Sessions’s justification for 
caging babies, flows from the same logic as Chae Chan Ping, in 
which the Court recognized the necessity of excluding “foreigners 
of a different race” in order to preserve the United States.302 Just as 
Sessions lamented that the “asylum statute is not a general hardship 
statute,”303 Marshall dithered that “[i]f it be true that the Cherokee 
nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are 
to be asserted.”304 The thousands of migrants forced to wait in Mex-
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ico—not allowed by the executive to enter U.S. territory—looks ee-
rily like an early reservation. This reasoning is so ingrained in the 
collective identity that anti-immigration activists assumed a de-
scendant of the people who have called this land home for millennia 
must have come from somewhere else—illegally.305 However, this 
mistake is not a surprise. The United States built a society around 
who it is not,306 and the nineteenth-century Indian problem has be-
come the twenty-first century border crisis. 
CONCLUSION: BREAKING THE CYCLE 
The ease with which the United States can label Indigenous mi-
grants as “illegal” people suggests that United States is not so far 
removed from its violent beginnings as it would perhaps like to 
think. By mischaracterizing itself as a nation of immigrants, this 
country denies its true history of conquest and genocide as justified 
by white supremacy. If the country only exists because it was taken 
from people who were not fit to have it, it logically follows that de-
scendants of the same people would be seen as invaders. 
The human cost to the Trump administration’s vitriol is real and 
mounting. As of December 23, 2019, there have been “at least 660 
publicly reported cases of murder, rape, torture, kidnapping, [and] 
other violent assaults” against migrants waiting in Mexico under the 
Migrant Protection Protocol.307 On November 25, 2019, a Honduran 
man was turned away from the United States and then kidnapped 
and tortured in front of his three-year-old son while his wife negoti-
ated a ransom payment from New Jersey.308 Customs and Border 
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Protection (“CBP”) has used tear gas to keep out Mexican and Cen-
tral American asylum seekers.309 Among migrants surveyed by im-
migration practitioners, 90% feel unsafe in Tijuana.310 Among those 
that have made it in, three children have died in CBP custody.311 
This is not the first time in our history that law enforcement has 
committed atrocities against people of Indigenous descent in the 
name of protecting the nation; this story is as American as Cowboys 
and Indians.312 If we want it to be the last time, I suggest we start by 
calling it by its name. The United States is not a nation of immi-
grants. It is a settler colony. 
The law must recognize the full humanity of migrants of Indig-
enous descent. An immediate change should be to stop the cruel, 
overt attempts to blockade Indigenous migrants from attempting to 
cross the border. The White House could hear asylum claims before 
deporting migrants to third countries and end MPP, which both force 
asylum seekers from one dangerous situation to another.  The United 
States claims to be a beacon of freedom and democracy. If this is to 
be so, it cannot simply ignore thousands of people fleeing persecu-
tion and lawlessness, hungry for a better life. The Attorney General 
can end the hand-wringing interpretations of asylum law that recog-
nize and lament the likelihood of imminent death while claiming to 
be powerless to prevent it.313 To ensure our commitment to never 
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send anyone to a country in which she will be persecuted, the legis-
lature can expand the statutory meaning of asylum. Rather than forc-
ing practitioners into molding ever more creative “particular social 
groups,” the legislature must expand protected grounds to include 
gender-based violence. Such shifts in law and policy would affirm 
the United States’ commitment to freedom, democracy, and the rule 
of law by making it clear that we welcome those fleeing persecution 
who want to live in peace, even if they do not fit traditional defini-
tions of what it means to be “American.” 
In order to stop the beating of the tell-tale heart from driving us 
mad, we must reconcile with the fact that we are standing atop a 
grave. The treatment of non-white immigrants—especially those 
with Indigenous blood—is a continuation of the white supremacy 
on which the United States bases its very sovereignty. Through truth 
and reconciliation with this history, the country can move toward 
what it claims to already be: a land of freedom that welcomes those 
fleeing persecution in search of a better life. 
